The SLPP–APC Struggle Of the 1970s

Following their defeat in the 1972 general elections, the SLPP began a gradual process of rebuilding, in preparation for the 1977 polls. The party, weakened but determined, sought to reorganise its structures and reestablish its presence across the country. Once the initial rebuilding phase was underway, preparations shifted toward an active campaign strategy, and from their earlier acquaintance in Mafanta Prison, Chief Yumkella had also developed a cordial relationship with Dauda. During this period, B.S. Massaquoi, the SLPP candidate for the Kenema Town Constituency and a mutual associate of both Dauda and Dr. Sama Banya, initiated a meeting between the two men. The discussion focused on maintaining mutual respect and civility throughout the campaign, despite the growing political tensions. Their shared history played a role in this understanding; both men had known each other for years.

At that time, the SLPP had lost its influence on nearly all fronts. With Sir Albert Margai in England and the party’s finances in disarray, Chief Yumkella, as Chairman, was confronted with the daunting challenge of securing funds for the campaign. Many former supporters had already defected to the APC, leaving the SLPP in a weakened state. Even Moinina Conteh, Dauda’s close ally during the 1972 general elections, abandoned the party to join the APC. The path forward for the SLPP appeared increasingly uncertain and difficult. While in prison, the Chairman was already considering strategies to raise funds for the next election. Chief Yumkella proposed buying and exporting cocoa as a possible means of generating income to finance the 1977 general elections. However, both men agreed it would be prudent to use another person as a front to avoid attracting undue attention.

It was Dauda who recommended his childhood friend, Juma Sei, for the role. After completing his studies at Durham University in England, Juma began his career as Managing Director of the African Development Bank (ADB) in Abidjan. During a visit home, he was persuaded by Siaka Stevens to return to Sierra Leone and contribute to national development, leading to his appointment as Managing Director of DIAMINCO, the company that would later become NDMC. With such an impressive record, Juma immediately stood out among the potential candidates. However, before this, Juma and Siaka Stevens, the then President and leader of the ruling APC party, clashed over the “Star of Sierra Leone,” one of the largest diamonds ever discovered. Juma advocated using the diamond to support the Leone and project the country’s image abroad, while Stevens had other plans. Unable to resolve the disagreement, Juma ultimately resigned. Beyond his professional achievements, Juma shared a long-standing personal bond with Dauda, dating back to their schooldays at Central School, Bunumbu, and later at The Bo School.

The early stages of recruitment were anything but smooth, sparking concern even for the Chairman. Many of those approached refused to accept the SLPP symbol, wary of what it might cost them. During one tense meeting at Bo School, Juma suggested that I.K. Foday – a respected senior teacher from Segbwema, be nominated to contest the seat once held by J.C. Barnett in 1967. But the odds were stacked against them. Ahead of the 1977 general elections, constituency boundaries had been deliberately redrawn to favour the ruling APC, making it even harder to find willing and viable candidates. In an effort to bring order to the chaos, responsibilities were divided: B.S. Massaquoi would handle recruitment in Kenema District, Dauda would oversee Kailahun, and Pa T. H. Bona would manage Kono. The Chairman found some comfort in this plan – he had not expected to gather many candidates from the Eastern Province in the first place. Yet, just as things seemed to be taking shape, disaster struck. The covert plan to use Juma Sei as a front for the cocoa purchase was exposed and the government quickly filled that space with Lebanese business men. The most notable was F. T. Saad, so their enterprise had to be abandoned. The Chairman took the failure to heart, frustrated but determined, he vowed to finance the campaign himself, using whatever modest resources he could muster.

The situation spiralled even further when APC supporters descended on his cattle ranch, slaughtering every animal in a calculated display of political intimidation. Outraged, he dared to speak out – and for that, he was swiftly arrested and taken to Pademba Road Prison. What the ruling APC failed to grasp was that the ranch was insured through Barclays Bank. The attack sent shockwaves through the business community, shaking investor confidence so severely that Barclays, long regarded as one of Sierra Leone’s most trusted financial institutions, began to contemplate a full withdrawal from the country to protect itself from mounting risks. Yet, this was only the beginning. Beneath the surface, deeper troubles were brewing. The leadership that was to cluster around the ruling APC would deliver the final blow just a few years later. When Sierra Leone hosted the OAU Summit in 1980, the financial strain and mismanagement that accompanied it pushed Barclays’ already-wavering commitment to the brink. What had begun with the destruction of a ranch would, in time, contribute to a crisis that reshaped the nation’s banking landscape.

While the Chairman languished behind bars, Sir Albert Margai reached out to the party leader, Salia Jusu-Sheriff, with an unexpected offer – he was willing to finance the upcoming election. It was a lifeline the struggling SLPP desperately needed. With the new funds, the remaining members of the party decided to buy twelve Mazda E2000 vans for the campaign – one for each district. For the first time since the 1967 general elections, the people of the south-east and the nation felt a flicker of hope. They watched with pride as vehicles bearing the SLPP symbol rumbled along the roads once more, carrying with them the promise of renewal.

All preparations were complete for the Kailahun-South campaign, covering Mandu, Malema, Dia, and Upper Bambara Chiefdoms. Dauda’s popularity was rooted in longstanding local ties: he had contested in 1972, maintained strong relationships with Paramount and local Chiefs, and had personal connections through his mother from Jojoima and his early years in Baiwala as a Quranic student. As the campaign progressed, it became clear to APC’s Dr. Sama Banya that Dauda was a formidable contender. The candidates divided the chiefdom visits on alternate days to avoid direct confrontation, with APC teams campaigning in the evenings when locals returned from the farms. Dauda, by contrast, conducted his SLPP campaign in the evenings at discreet locations, enabling strategic discussions and decision-making without interference. This approach not only safeguarded sensitive planning, but also maximised the effectiveness of his outreach, reinforcing his position as a serious challenger.

A few days before the elections, reports from Bo indicated that APC’s Dr. Banya had recognised the significant challenges posed by Dauda’s popularity and widespread support across the Kailahun-South constituency. Alarmed by the prospect of defeat, he reached out to his political mentor, the first Vice President, S. I. Koroma, and the party’s leadership for guidance and support. After assessing the situation, the party concluded that conventional campaign strategies were unlikely to secure victory. In the tense and highly charged political climate of the time, they ultimately resolved that the only way to neutralise the threat posed by the SLPP candidate was through his elimination – a stark reflection of the extreme measures Dr. Banya was willing to consider to maintain political dominance.

The news ignited an immediate surge of alarm – tempers flared, tensions spiked, and every SLPP antenna went up at once. The party sensed danger. Urgent messages were dispatched to Bo, signalling the need to activate their defences without delay. The warning was so stark and severe that no one dared dismiss it. This time, the SLPP candidates were determined to stand their ground and defend their political rights. The long-preached Christian counsel of Salia Jusu-Sheriff to “turn the other cheek” if attacked was set aside. Instead, the membership rallied behind the harder rhetoric of Kandeh Bureh: “an eye for an eye.” Kandeh, who had gone with Dauda to Kailahun during the violence of 1972, was unwilling to witness a repeat of that traumatic chapter.

Two days before the election, the first blow landed. APC sleeper cells in Bo suddenly activated, reinforced by the (ISU) – Internal Security Unit, as they were then called, and stormed the SLPP party office. Chaos exploded in the streets. The party in Freetown ordered Daramy Rogers and all other candidates to seize control of the town. And then, from the shadows, a young man stepped forward – James Kendekah. No title, no position, just raw courage, with a small band of loyalists, he fought through the night, street by street, alley by alley. When the first roosters crowed at dawn, it was James and his men who held Bo. It was a fierce opening act, one that sent an unmistakable message. Even the APC understood it: this was not 1972. And the real storm had yet to break.

What the APC had started in Bo sent shocking waves right throughout the east. In Mobai, Dauda received a dispatched rider on a motor bike with a note from Pendembu, reported to have been sent from Kailahum town. Before the dispatch return, a group of men came and took Dauda to safe place. While on their way to this place of safety. Dauda’s brother, Kabba-Sei, returned from his farm and discovered the house abandoned. He moved to close the door and windows, not aware of what was happening. He was just stepping out when as usual, Dr. Sama Banya, the APC candidate approached the compound accompanied by four vehicles, all full with men hanging out like branches. As he later recalled, he approached the vehicle and greeted Dr. Banya, before he could greet, he was stabbed in the head with what was later believed to be a knife-like weapon attached to a gun. This was a mistaken identity, which Dr. Banya came to pay for dearly. As he fell on the floor, the APC candidate fled the scene heading for Baiwala to campaign as usual, as if nothing had happened.

Moments later, Dauda emerged from his place of safety and confronted the aftermath of the attack. Urgent communications were sent to Kenema to inform B. S. Massaquoi of the incident. Meanwhile, the conflict that had originated in Bo had already spread to Kenema. A young SLPP activist, popularly known as Baba Yara – the eldest son of Chief Samba of Daru – led an effort to secure control of the town, including the fortification of the SLPP office at Kai-Samba Terrace.

Baba Yara was subsequently deployed to take control of Mano Junction, a strategic point intended to restrict movement into or out of Kenema. While the stated purpose was to prevent further incursions, there existed an additional concern: reports had reached Kenema falsely claiming that Dauda had been killed. If these reports had proven accurate, many within the party believed that Dr. Banya would be held directly responsible upon interception – he was to meet his maker! From Mobai, a secondary contingent was dispatched to Foobu – the small Liberian border town long regarded as the operational heart of the Kabba-Sei clan. Historically, Foobu had demonstrated formidable organizational capacity, most notably during Brigadier Lansana’s escape.

In keeping with this precedent, the community responded immediately and decisively upon receiving news of the crisis. That night, illuminated by a sharp, unobstructed moon, Dauda positioned himself atop the stump of a recently fallen tree to coordinate what had become an urgent defensive mobilisation. Early reports erroneously announcing the death of Kabba-Sei, Dauda’s younger brother had electrified the local population, and Dauda seized the moment to structure their response. He ordered palm trees cut and laid across the roadway at multiple strategic points, creating a series of barricades designed to slow or immobilise any hostile approach.

The defenders waited for reinforcements from Foobu – fifty men armed with machine guns scheduled to arrive and launch a coordinated engagement, with the explicit instruction to return by 4:00 a.m. By 10:30 p.m., the Foobu contingent reached Mobai, their fighters adorned with traditional protective charms and prepared for sustained combat. Additional volunteers from Mandu, Dia, and Jojoima soon followed, swelling the force to a significant regional coalition. The planned confrontation site was Lowoma, a small settlement concealed within dense palm groves and situated at a tactically crucial T-junction linking Baiwala, Mobai, and Jojoima. Shortly before midnight, the assembled fighters heard the distant rumble of engines, followed by the glare of vehicle headlights refracting through the lattice of palm fronds.

As the convoy approached Lowoma, a child emerged briefly on the roadway and signalled for the vehicles to halt – a ritual gesture, understood locally as a persuasive charm intended to restrain the violence about to unfold. The occupants, however, misread the moment. Interpreting the gesture as trivial or obstructive, they accelerated. As the child vanished into the darkness, the convoy advanced unimpeded toward the barricades. In doing so, it crossed an invisible threshold – one that led not toward its intended objective, but into a valley of meticulously prepared and imminent destruction.

The command to initiate the ambush was delivered with precision. Gunfire erupted simultaneously from multiple positions, directed at the convoy of vehicles, each crowded with armed men carrying grenades, rifles, and improvised weapons. As in most irregular engagements, the decisive advantage lay in the element of surprise, and the APC contingent experienced its force in full measure. Within minutes, the intensity and concentration of the gunfire overwhelmed the attackers. Confined within their vehicles and unable to establish a defensive posture, they rapidly lost cohesion. Witnesses later recalled the scene as one of mechanical and human disintegration: vehicles swerving unpredictably, some overturning with their wheels still spinning in the air in what local fighters described as a state of “self-beating.” Several combatants were killed instantly; others, disoriented and trapped, became casualties of the ensuing chaos.

To conserve ammunition for anticipated engagements, the surviving members of the APC force were removed from the disabled vehicles and executed in the swamps bordering the road. Among the group accompanying Dr. Sama Banya were two of his brothers. During the attack, Banya feigned death and was initially presumed among the fallen. All recovered arms and ammunition were transferred to the Paramount Chief for custodial security, a measure typical of local wartime protocols. The SLPP operatives then issued a carefully crafted public statement asserting that the convoy had merely passed through the area and was last observed “moving eastward toward the rising sun,” thereby masking the scale of the confrontation.

At first light, the APC organised a search party to locate their missing candidate. They eventually found Dr. Banya alive, but gravely wounded, concealed close to the ambush site, an outcome that Dauda would later describe as one of the enduring regrets of his political life. Banya was transported to Segbwema, where he was met by the APC’s chief intelligence operative, Foday Sankoh – later leader of the RUF, who at that time was operating under the guise of a local photographer. Foday Sankoh was part of a military coup in the 1970s, who used his northern links to volunteer all the information about the others. He gave all the information incriminating the others and served as a state prosecution witness in that case. Was later freed and stationed in Segbwema to keep watch on the Daru Moa military Barracks. The voting went on and Dauda declared as the winner with 1346 votes. The APC candidate, Dr Banya, was air lifted to Freetown and sent to London for medical treatment.

To be continued

Dauda Sandi (Jr)